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Prescription of Criminal Prosecutions in Louisiana
Articles 8 and 9 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Proce-
dure' provide two major prescriptive periods for criminal prose-
cutions: a one-year period within which a formal charge must
be filed, and a three-year period after the filing of such a charge,
within which the accused must be brought to trial. The object
of this comment is to show the court's interpretation of the
provisions establishing these two prescriptive periods.2
Prescription on Filing the Charge
Article 8 provides in part that:
"No person shall be prosecuted, tried3 or punished... unless
the indictment, information, or affidavit for the same be
found or filed within one year after the offense shall have
been made known to the judge, district attorney or grand
jury having jurisdiction .... -4
Both the prosecution for the seven major crimes enumerated
in Article 85 and the prosecution and conviction for a lesser and
included crime under an indictment charging one of the seven
crimes are excepted from this one-year prescription, in effect
making the crimes imprescriptible.6 The one-year prescriptive
period begins to run as to other crimes 7 when the authorities
1. LA. R.S. 15:8, 15:9 (1950). These limitations are strictly procedural.
State v. Bussa, 176 La. 87, 145 So. 276 (1933); State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623,
138 So. 124 (1931). See CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 149 et seq.
(2d ed. 1918).
2. See other Louisiana statutes regarding prescription of criminal ac-
tions: LA. R.S. 15:81 (1950), time for release of prisoner arrested without war-
rant; LA. R.S. 15:168 (1950), discharge of persons arrested and detained
pending extradition; LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (1950), habitual offender law; LA. R.S.
30:51 (1950), prescription of penalties for violation of Conservation Act.
3. The article protects accused against conviction and relieves him of
being tried. State v. Sullivan, 159 La. 589, 105 So. 631 (1925).
4. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
5. Murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated arson,
aggravated burglary, armed robbery, and treason. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
6. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950). For example, although an indictment for man-
slaughter has prescribed, a conviction for that crime will be sustained
under an indictment for murder.
7. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950). Fines and forfeitures must be charged within
six months of their incurrence. See also LA. R.S. 30:51 (1950). Where the
act is punishable by fine or imprisonment, prosecution is governed by the
one-year prescription. State v. Richard, 123 La. 179, 48 So. 880 (1909). Where
prison term is a consequence of failure to pay fine, the six-months period
is applicable. State v. Pujol, 180 La. 82, 156 So. 182 (1934); State v. Rhodes,
150 La. 1064, 91 So. 512 (1922); State v. Courlas, 134 La. 364, 64 So. 141
(1913); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858). For applicability of the sta-
tute in civil matters where a fine or forfeiture is imposed, see McHugh v.
Placid Oil Co., 206 La. 511, 19 So.2d 221 (1944).
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acquire actual knowledge of who committed the offense8 or
when they acquire knowledge sufficient to put them on inquiry. 9
If an indictment is found more than a year after the alleged
date of the offense, the state must show in the indictment that
the offense has not prescribed."' This may be done by alleging
that the one-year prescription began to run only when the offense
was made known to a competent authority within the preceding
year, or by showing that prescription was interrupted either
by a prior, timely charge, or by the accused's flight from justice.
Where an indictment shows that the offense was committed
more than a year prior to charging the accused, the allegations
sufficient to negative prescription may vary. For example, the
court has held sufficient the allegation that the offense had
"just" come to the knowledge of the appropriate officer.' Simi-
larly, the court has considered adequate the allegation that the
offense was not known to the proper authorities "until June" of
the year in which the information was filed.' 2 In another case,
a divided court held that the words "yet more than one year
has not elapsed" meant "within one year."'31 The date the offense
became known should be alleged where available, and the court
has suggested that the indictment should contain the averment
that it is filed within one year after the offense was made known.14
To negative prescription by alleging that a prior indictment
had been filed, the state must show the timeliness of the first
indictment with a full statement of the offense previously
8. State v. Hanks, 38 La. Ann. 468 (1886).
9. State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24 So.2d 819 (1946); State v. Young, 194
La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940). "If the officer charged with the duty of insti-
tuting the prosecution is permitted to negative prescription by merely
stating he did not have actual knowledge of the commission of the offense,
such a holding would, in a large measure and for all practical reasons,
nullify the effect of this law." State v. Oliver, 196 La. 659, 670, 199 So. 793,
797 (1941).
Information given to the assistant district attorneys is sufficient to
put the district attorney on inquiry. State v. Brocato, 205 La. 1019, 18 So.2d
602 (1944). Knowledge by the sheriff and his deputies is not sufficient to
start running of prescription. State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24 So.2d 819
(1946).
10. State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945); State v. Gehlbach,
205 La. 340, 17 So.2d 349 (1943); State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
See also cases cited in State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1919). It is
not necessary to show crime charged occurred on a precise day, if proof
shows crime was committed on any day within a year previous to finding
bill of indictment which the jury is trying. State v. Clark, 8 Rob. 533 (La.
1844).
11. State v. Hinton, 49 La. Ann. 1354, 22 So. 617 (1897).
12. State v. Bussa, 176 La. 87, 145 So. 276 (1933).
13. State v. Gehlbach, 205 La. 340, 347, 17 So.2d 349, 351 (1943).
14. State v. Doucet, 205 La. 648, 17 So.2d 907 (1944); State v. Gehlbach,
205 La. 340, 17 So.2d 349 (1943).
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charged, and must also allege what disposition was made of the
previous indictment. 15 This information assures the court that
prescription beginning to run on the date of knowledge was
interrupted by the first charge, and that the one-year period
did not subsequently elapse. It has been argued'( that the prior
indictment might be presumed to be pending, unless the con-
trary were shown by the defense; but the court required in two
cases' 7 that there be further averments by the state showing
that prescription had not run after the alleged interruption.
Even an invalid indictment is effective to interrupt prescription
if it is filed in a parish of proper venue.1 8 Prescription begins
to run anew from the date upon which the initial indictment
is officially set aside or annulled. 19 To negative prescription
with the allegation that the accused was a "fugitive from justice"
it must be shown during trial that the defendant was seeking
to avoid prosecution for the crime charged. 20
There are no Louisiana cases discussing the prescription
for continuing crimes. The rule followed in other jurisdictions
is that if any part of the crime has not prescribed, the entire
crime is held not to have prescribed. 2
1
To bring the issue of prescription before the court the de-
fendant ordinarily uses a special plea of prescription. If the
indictment shows on its face that the crime has prescribed, the
defense may either demur or urge prescription in a motion to
quash.22 Prescription, because it involves no facts pertinent to
15. State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945).
16. Ibid.
17. State v. Dooley, 223 La. 980, 67 So.2d 558 (1953), 15 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 216 (1954); State v. Jones, 209 La. 394, 24 So.2d 627 (1945).
18. State v. Smith, 200 La. 10, 7 So.2d 368 (1942), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1941-1942 Term-Criminal Procedure,
5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEWW 241, 243 (1943). Indictment defective by reason of
irregularity in empaneling grand jury is sufficient to interrupt prescription.
State v. Hoffman, 120 La. 949, 45 So. 951 (1908) semble.
19. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
20. State v. Berryhill, 188 La. 549, 177 So, 663 (1937). Flight from private
wrath of victim without concealing self from prosecuting officers is not
flight from justice. State v. Hayes, 161 La. 963, 109 So. 778 (1926). Where
the offcers have power and authority to seize accused whose whereabouts
are known, prescription is not interrupted. State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24
So.2d 819 (1946).
21. United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1939) semble, cert.
denied, 307 U.S. 643 (1939); Pioneer Packing Co. v. United States, 99 F.2d
547 (9th Cir. 1938); Hurst v. State, 44 Ga. App. 289, 161 S.E. 278 (1931);
State v. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 7 N.W. 516 (1880); Commonwealth v. Ross, 248
Mass. 15, 142 N.E. 791 (1924).
22. Demurrer: State v. Bryan, 19 La. Ann. 435 (1867). Differentiating
the use of motion to quash and the plea of prescription: State v. Conega,
121 La. 522, 46 So. 614 (1908).
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guilt or innocence,23 may be pleaded and tried in limine before
the judge.24 If the judge sustains the plea, the state has the right
of appeal;2 5 if the judge overrules the plea, the issue may not
thereafter be raised before the jury,26 but a bill of exceptions
may be reserved for the purpose of seeking a new trial or taking
an appeal based on the court's ruling. The right to trial of the
plea in limine may be waived, and, under a general plea of not
guilty, the issue of prescription can be presented to the jury.27
The defendant can raise the issue of prescription during the trial
by insisting on proof that the crime occurred within one year
prior to the indictment. After urging prescription before the jury,
however, the defendant no longer has the right to have the judge
pass upon it.28 If the jury finds the defendant guilty, the issue
will not be reviewed on appeal because the appellate court con-
siders itself without power to review a jury finding on the plea.20
During the latter stages of the trial, defendant may urge pre-
scription for the first time in a motion for new trial,30 or, where
the crime is shown to be prescribed on the face of the indictment,
by a motion in arrest of judgment or by an assignment of error.8'
The burden of proof is on the state to prove that prescrip-
tion was interrupted. 32 The defendant, on the other hand, bears
the burden of proving that the proper officials had such knowl-
edge of the offense as would support the plea of prescription,
thus relieving the state of the burden of proving a universal
negative.83
23. State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 322 (1939); State v. Bussa, 176
La. 87, 145 So. 276 (1932); State v. Hayes, 161 La. 963, 109 So. 778 (1926).
24. State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939); State v. Brown, 185
La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936); State v. Posey, 157 La. 55, 101 So. 869 (1924).
25. State v. Pierre, 49 La. Ann. 1159, 22 So. 373 (1897),
26. State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939). But see State
v. Beale, 163 La. 1093, 1096, 113 So. 546, 547 (1927); State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917,
922, 111 So. 327, 329 (1927).
27. State v. Strong, 39 La. Ann. 1081, 3 So. 266 (1887); State v. Cason,
28 La. Ann. 40 (1876).
28. State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936); State v. Posey, 157
La. 55, 101 So. 869 (1924).
29. State v. Beale, 163 La. 1093, 113 So. 546 (1927). The alleged insuffi-
ciency of evidence adduced before the jury to prove interruption is not
assignable as error. State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235 (1942); State
v. Drummond, 132 La. 749, 61 So. 778 (1913).
30. State v. Block, 179 La. 426, 154 So. 46 (1934). See State v. Oliver,
193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939) semble; State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So.
41 (1919).
31. See State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235 (1942) semble; State v.
Forrest, 23 La. Ann. 433 (1871) semble.
32. State v. Anderson, 51 La. Ann. 1181, 25 So. 990 (1899). See Comment,
6 LOUISIANA LAW REviow 274 (1945).
33. State v. Keife, 165 La. 47, 115 So. 363 (1928); State v. Fuller, 164 La.
718, 114 So. 606 (1927); State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327 (1927); State
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Prescription on Bringing to Trial
The second major prescriptive period for the prosecution of
a criminal act is a three-year limitation on bringing felons to
trial after they have been charged.34 The defendant's right to
this limitation and the procedure for enforcing it are provided
for in Articles 8 and 935 as follows:
".. . it shall be the duty of the district attorney to enter a
nolle prosequi if the accused has not been tried, and if [he]
fail or neglect to do so, the court may on motion of the de-
fendant ...cause such nolle prosequi to be entered. .... -. 1
"Whenever it shall have been established . . . that the pre-
scriptive periods as herein provided have elapsed . . .and
that the district attorney has not entered his nolle prosequi,
the court shall order the dismissal of said prosecution ....
When the district attorney or the court enters a nolle prosequi
after prescription has run on the charge, the defendant is
completely relieved of criminal responsibility for the offense
charged.38
The three-year prescription can be interrupted by the de-
fendant's voluntary absence from the state without written con-
sent of the court where the charge against him is pending, or,
by his flight from justice.3 9 Absence by reason of incarceration
in a federal prison is not "voluntary" within the contemplation
of the statute and does not interrupt prescription.40 But pre-
v. Posey, 157 La. 55, 101 So. 869 (1924); State v. Barfield, 36 La. Ann. 89
(1884); State v. Barrow, 31 La. Ann. 691 (1879).
34. Prior to Act 147 of 1942, the period was six years. For a discussion
of the 1942 act, see State v. Shushan, 206 La. 415, 19 So.2d 185 (1944). A two-
year prescription is applicable to all other charges. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
Neither period is applicable to delay in bringing a "new trial" after one
is granted on motion of the defendant. State v. Pitre, 171 La. 751, 132 So.
221 (1931).
35. LA. R.S. 15:8, 15:9 (1950).
36. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
37. LA. R.S. 15:9 (1950).
38. "... the court shall order the dismissal of said prosecution, and the
same shall not thereafter be revived .. " LA. R.S. 15:9 (1950). The state
has right of appeal where defendant obtains nolle prosequi. State v. Shu-
shan, 204 La. 672, 16 So.2d 227 (1943). Dismissal of charge on defendant's
motion operates "the same as if entered by the district attorney." LA. R.S.
15:8 (1950).
39. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950). Since the amendment of Article 9 in 1950, La.
Acts 1950, No. 487, p. 883, if a defendant is released on bond, written con-
sent of the judge is unnecessary and the defendant can absent himself from
the state without interrupting prescription, provided he make a timely
appearance for his trial.
40. State v. Shushan, 206 La. 415, 19 So.2d 185 (1944).
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scription is interrupted if the defendant delays the trial by em-
ploying dilatory pleas. Whether such pleas caused an improper
delay presents an issue of fact and in at least one instance a
defendant was discharged when his trial was delayed by the
court's failure to timely act on defendant's properly urged plea. 4'
Although Articles 8 and 9 do not provide for a suspen-
sion of the three-year prescription, the court has held that since
a person adjudged insane is involuntarily beyond the process of
law prescription will be suspended, but not interrupted, until
he be adjudged sane.42
Article 9 expressly provides that the burden of proving the
accrual of the three-year prescription shall rest upon the person
alleging it. Thus if the defendant moves to set the charge aside,
he must prove that he was amenable to prosecution at all times
during the prescriptive period.43
A nolle prosequi entered before the three-year prescription
on bringing to trial has run will, under the provisions of Article
8, merely start anew the one-year prescription on bringing the
charge. 44 There seems to be nothing to prevent the state from
circumventing the three-year prescription by (1) filing a timely
charge, (2) permitting it to run for almost three years, (3)
entering a nolle prosequi, (4) bringing a new charge within a
year negativing prescription, and (5) repeating the process ad
infinitum. But dictum in a recent case indicates that, in keeping
with the purpose of Articles 8 and 9, the accused must be brought
to trial within three years from the date of filing the first charge,
regardless of how many subsequent charges might be made and
dismissed.45
The courts have not discussed the question of whether an
indictment brought for one of the seven enumerated crimes is
subject to the three-year prescription because of an accused's
constitutional right to a speedy trial.46 The seven crimes excepted
41. Denial of request for bill of particulars, State v. Bradford, 217 La.
32, 45 So.2d 897 (1950).
42. State v. Theard, 212 La. 1022, 34 So.2d 248 (1948). Presumably the
same reasoning would apply to the involuntary nature of incarceration in
the federal penitentiary if there were no procedure established for obtaining
release of federal prisoners to stand trial in state courts. State v. Shushan,
206 La. 415, 19 So.2d 185 (1944) describes procedure for obtaining release of
prisoners to custody of state officials for prosecution.
43. LA, R.S. 15:9 (1950).
44. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
45. State v. Murray, 222 La. 950, 956, 64 So.2d 230, 232 (1953).
46. LA. CONST. Art. I, § 9. See also U.S. CONST. AmEND. VL
1954]
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from the one-year prescription on bringing the charge are not
similarly excepted from the three-year prescription on bringing
to trial; 47 yet, the court might well hold that a prosecution for
one of the seven crimes cannot prescribe in any fashion.
Mary Ellen Caldwell
47. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950).
